What mistakes can cause you to lose your crypto assets?
It’s surprisingly easy to lose access to crypto through simple mistakes. I’ve learned the hard way how a few common errors can cost us dearly.
Common mistakes that can make me lose my crypto include losing my wallet’s seed phrase or private key, accidentally deleting my wallet app without a backup, or forgetting my wallet password.

Losing your wallet’s seed phrase or private key
When I first started, I didn’t realize that my seed phrase and private key are the ultimate proof of ownership. If I lose them, I lose access to my money, period. There’s no “forgot password” option on the blockchain. Once, a crypto friend of mine made a nearly fatal mistake: he translated his wallet’s 12-word English seed phrase into Chinese, wrote those down, and then closed the wallet page. Later, he found out the wallet app would not accept Chinese characters for recovery. He panicked and tried every translation he could think of. Luckily, after many attempts, he guessed the correct original words and restored his funds. It was a close call and a lesson learned.
Now I treat my seed phrase like a sack of gold. I never take a screenshot or photo of it, and I never store it on any online device. If someone else gets that phrase or the private key, they can access and spend all my crypto without my permission. Here are the rules I live by now to protect my keys:
- Never screenshot or photograph your seed phrase or private key. Someone could see it, or malware could copy your camera roll.
- Never copy-paste your seed phrase on a device that’s online. Some malicious programs spy on your clipboard and will steal that information.
- Never share your seed phrase or key over chat or email. Even if you trust the person, chats can be hacked or intercepted. I keep mine strictly offline, written on paper and stored safely.
I even have multiple copies of my seed phrase written down and stored in separate secure locations (like a home safe or a bank deposit box). This way, if I ever lose one copy or something happens to my house, I have a backup. It might feel tedious, but having that offline backup is the only way to prove “I own my crypto” if things go wrong.
I also make a habit of testing my backups. I periodically take a spare device, enter my seed phrase, and ensure I can recover my wallet. This gives me peace of mind that my backups are correct. It’s better to discover a mistake in your backup during a test than when it’s too late.
Accidentally deleting your wallet app (without a backup)
Another nightmare I avoid is accidentally deleting my wallet app before I’ve saved my backup. Remember, the app itself isn’t your money—the keys inside it are. If the app is removed and you don’t have your seed phrase or private key saved elsewhere, you could be in big trouble.
I’ve seen this happen to others. One of my clients was at a bank, and the bank officer handling his phone noticed a crypto wallet app installed. Mistaking it for a malicious app or a virus, the well-meaning officer uninstalled the wallet on the spot. My client was shocked. He hadn’t written down his seed phrase or private key anywhere else. In a panic, he went home and reinstalled the app, hoping everything would magically reappear. Unfortunately, by reinstalling, he actually wiped any chance of recovering the old wallet data from the phone. All the crypto that was in that wallet was effectively gone forever. It was a heartbreaking loss that could have been avoided.
From that story, I learned two things: First, always back up your wallet’s seed phrase as soon as you create the wallet. If my client had a backup, he could have simply re-imported it into the reinstalled app. Second, if a wallet app ever gets deleted by accident and you have no backup, do not rush to reinstall the app immediately. I’ve been advised by recovery experts that sometimes the wallet data can be recovered from the device storage if you haven’t overwritten it with new data (like installing the app again). In such a case, it’s best to stop using the device and seek professional help to retrieve the data. But this is a long shot and can be expensive. It’s far better to have that backup in the first place and not need any data rescue.
Personally, I’m very careful on my phone now. I dismiss any “this app may be harmful” warnings for my trusted wallet apps instead of agreeing to uninstall. And I make sure family or colleagues know not to delete anything on my phone without asking me. My wallet apps are often protected by an additional password or biometrics too, so even if someone had my phone, they can’t easily get in or delete it. It might be paranoia, but when it comes to my money, a little paranoia is healthy.
Forgetting your wallet password
For most wallets, aside from the seed phrase, I set a local password or PIN to open the app or send transactions. This adds a layer of security—but it also adds a risk: if I forget that password and don’t have my seed phrase, I could lock myself out of my own wallet. Even if I do have the seed, a lost password is an inconvenience since I’d have to restore the wallet on a new app. But if I failed to back up the seed and also forgot the password, recovering the funds becomes a technical nightmare.
I’ve heard countless stories of early Bitcoin adopters who mined or bought coins years ago, set up a wallet on their computer with a password, and years later realized their small stash is now worth millions—but they can’t remember the password. There’s a famous story of a programmer who had only a few guesses left on a password protecting $240 million worth of Bitcoin, and he couldn’t recall it. That kind of situation is agonizing.
So what can be done if you truly forget a wallet password? If you still have access to the wallet file (or device) and just lost the password, there are “brute force” tools that can attempt to crack it by guessing billions of combinations. However, their success depends on how strong your password was. Short or simple passwords can sometimes be cracked quickly, while long, complex ones are virtually impossible to brute force. In one case, I learned that a wallet password under about 12 characters (if it’s not completely random and follows common patterns) might be cracked in roughly a day or two. If it’s around 15 characters, it could take months. Anything beyond 15 characters of randomness is usually impractical to brute force with today’s technology.
To illustrate this, consider the approximate time it might take to brute-force different password lengths:
| Wallet Password Length | Estimated Time to Crack * |
|---|---|
| 8–12 characters (simple patterns) | Around 24 hours |
| 13–15 characters (some complexity) | Up to 2–3 months |
| 16+ characters (high complexity) | Years or effectively impossible |
*Assuming attackers use advanced tools and have some hints about the password structure. Truly random passwords on the longer end are exponentially harder to crack.
Looking at the table above, I feel much better if I’ve used a long, unique passphrase for my wallet. It also drives home the earlier point: if I have my seed phrase backed up, I don’t need to rely on remembering the password or breaking into the wallet. I can always restore my funds with the seed phrase on another device and set a new password. These days, I make my wallet passwords long but I also securely record them on paper (stored separately from my seed phrase). This way, I’m protected both ways: strong passwords keep others out, and backups ensure I’m not locked out.
In summary, to avoid losing crypto due to a forgotten password, my strategy is:
- Use strong, long passwords for my wallets (but not so unique that I can’t recall or write them down).
- Back up the seed phrase so I always have a fallback if the password is lost.
- Consider password managers or a secure notebook to store passwords if you have too many to remember, but keep that storage very safe.
By addressing these common mistakes—securing my keys, keeping backups, and remembering passwords—I greatly reduce the chance of ever losing access to my crypto. But personal errors aren’t the only threat out there. Next, I’ll cover the external threats: the scammers and hackers who want to separate us from our hard-earned coins.
| Mistake | What Happens | Why It’s Dangerous | How to Prevent It |
|---|---|---|---|
| Losing Seed Phrase / Private Key | You permanently lose access to your crypto. | Seed phrase = ultimate ownership. No reset, no recovery. | Keep offline backups, never screenshot, never share, store in multiple secure places. |
| Storing Seed Phrase Online | Hackers/malware can steal it instantly. | Clipboard trackers & cloud leaks expose your keys. | Write on paper only, store offline, avoid digital storage. |
| Accidentally Deleting Wallet App (No Backup) | Wallet is gone forever if backup wasn’t saved. | App deletion wipes keys; reinstalling may overwrite recoverable data. | Always back up seed phrase immediately; avoid deleting wallet apps; educate others not to delete. |
| Forgetting Wallet Password | Locked out of wallet; brute-force recovery may take months or be impossible. | Strong passwords cannot be cracked; forgotten password + no seed = total loss. | Use long passwords AND back up seed phrase; store written copies securely. |
| Not Testing Backup Seed Phrase | You may discover too late that your backup was incorrect. | A wrong word = unrecoverable wallet. | Periodically test recovery on a spare device. |
| Letting Someone Else Access Your Phone | Others may delete or tamper with your wallet apps. | Well-meaning people can cause irreversible loss. | Use biometrics, lock wallet apps, warn family/colleagues. |
How do hackers and scammers steal crypto assets?
Not all threats come from my mistakes; some come from bad actors trying to steal my crypto. Here are the most common scams and hacks I’ve encountered.
Crypto assets are often stolen when I accidentally expose my private keys or seed phrase, fall for malicious app or smart contract scams, send funds to the wrong address, or use fake wallet software or devices.

Exposing your private keys or seed phrase online
Even if I do everything right on my end, a single moment of negligence can hand my money to a thief. The most direct way scammers steal crypto is by obtaining your private key or seed phrase. In a sense, it’s not even “stealing” because if they have those keys, the blockchain treats them as the rightful owner. That’s why I’m extremely careful never to expose my keys online.
I know someone who learned this lesson in a painful way. He was traveling and staying at a nice hotel. One night, he needed to access one of his crypto wallets on a new device. It was late (around 1 AM) and, feeling tired, he connected to the hotel’s public Wi-Fi and entered his seed phrase into his wallet app to restore it. Big mistake. By around 3 AM, he got alerts on his phone – every coin in that wallet, on every blockchain it held assets, had been transferred out. Over $40,000 USD worth of crypto was gone in an instant. We suspect that the hotel Wi-Fi or an attacker on that network was logging everything, or perhaps he had malware on his device that transmitted his keys. Because the seed phrase was exposed to the internet, someone was able to grab it and immediately emptied his funds. It was a harsh reminder: never, ever input sensitive keys when connected to an untrusted network (or ideally, any network).
To protect myself, I follow the golden rules mentioned earlier. I’ll reiterate them because they are so important:
- Do not digitize your keys: No screenshots, no saving in notes apps or cloud storage. Keeping keys purely offline (on paper or engraved on metal) is far safer.
- Be cautious with your clipboard: Avoid copying and pasting keys or passwords. If I must, I make sure it’s on a secure, offline computer because malware can monitor clipboard data.
- Only enter your seed phrase in a secure environment: If I need to restore a wallet, I do it on a trusted device using the official wallet app, and ideally offline. I would never do this in a public place or on public Wi-Fi where someone could be eavesdropping.
- Use hardware wallets for extra security: A hardware wallet keeps the private keys offline and never exposes them, even when you connect to a computer. I often use a hardware wallet for large holdings because even if my computer is infected, the hacker still can’t get my keys out of the hardware device.
By treating my private keys like the crown jewels, I reduce the chance a hacker can ever get hold of them. Most of the time, hackers don’t brute-force crypto accounts (that’s practically impossible if you use strong keys); instead, they trick people into giving up the keys. So I stay paranoid in a good way: I assume anyone asking for my keys or phrases is trying to steal from me, and I act accordingly.
Authorizing malicious apps or smart contracts
The world of decentralized finance (DeFi) is exciting, but it comes with new security pitfalls. One of them is malicious app or smart contract authorizations. I learned that when I connect my wallet to a decentralized app (dApp) or DeFi service, it might ask me to approve a permission—like allowing the contract to spend a certain token from my wallet. If I blindly approve, a clever scam contract can then spend my tokens without further consent, just as I allowed it to do.
Think of it like setting up auto-pay on your bank account. If you authorize a company to auto-debit your account, they can take money each month without asking again. In crypto, if I authorize a fake DeFi app that looks legit but is malicious, I might be granting them permission to drain a specific token from my wallet at any time.
A personal example: A friend once asked me about a new yield farming opportunity on the Tron blockchain involving a token called JST. It promised ridiculously high returns for staking some USDT (Tether). The process was: you go to their site, connect your Tron wallet, approve the contract, and deposit USDT, then you’d supposedly earn lots of JST tokens in return. It sounded too good to be true, and I immediately felt it was sketchy. I told my friend, “This looks like a scam, I wouldn’t touch it.” He was lured by the potential profits and went ahead despite my warning. Sadly, my instincts were right. The dApp was a trap. As soon as he approved and deposited his USDT into the contract, the scammers used the permission to transfer all that USDT out to their own address. He basically handed them his money, and they didn’t need his password or confirmation beyond that initial approval. In the end, he got nothing back – no high yields, and his USDT was gone for good.
From situations like that, I’ve learned to be extremely skeptical of any app that asks for broad permissions. Now, before I authorize a smart contract, I ask myself a few questions:
- Do I fully trust this app or platform? If it’s not a well-known, reputable DeFi platform, I stay away. No insane interest rate is worth losing my principal.
- What exactly am I authorizing? Many wallets will show the specific permissions. If it says something like “Allow access to all your tokens” or an unlimited amount, that’s a huge red flag. I prefer to set a specific spend limit if possible.
- Can I revoke this permission later? I regularly use tools or wallet features to review and revoke token approvals that I no longer need. For instance, if I tried a DeFi app once, I go back and remove its access to my wallet afterward. This way, even if that app was fine at the time, if it ever gets hacked or turns malicious, it won’t have a live permission to use against me.
By treating approvals carefully, I avoid falling into the trap of “authorized theft.” It’s a bit technical, but in summary: I don’t authorize what I don’t understand, and I minimize trust when it comes to my crypto interacting with external contracts.
Sending cryptocurrency to the wrong address
Believe it or not, sending crypto to the wrong address is another way people effectively “lose” crypto to scammers. Crypto transactions are irreversible – once you send coins to an address, there’s no bank to call to get it back. Scammers have gotten clever: they exploit our habits and small lapses in attention.
One crafty scam I encountered recently involved my own transaction history. I noticed that my wallet had a bunch of incoming transactions of 0 ETH (zero-value Ethereum transactions) from addresses that I didn’t recognize. At first, I thought nothing of it since it didn’t affect my balance. But then I looked closely and realized those sender addresses looked strikingly similar to the address of a friend I frequently send crypto to. The beginning and ending characters of the addresses were the same as my friend’s address – only the middle was different. This was not a coincidence; it was a setup.
Scammers know that when many of us send crypto, we might go to a previous transaction and copy the address from there, assuming it’s the correct one (especially if the label or first/last characters look familiar). By sending me a 0 ETH transaction, the scammer’s address got recorded in my history. If I had absentmindedly copied it thinking it was my friend’s (since it looked similar at a glance), I would have sent my next payment straight to the scammer. In fact, one of my acquaintances fell for this trick. He saw what he thought was his usual address in the history and copied it, not realizing some characters were off. He sent a substantial amount of tokens, and they landed in the scammer’s wallet, unrecoverable. That’s a devastating way to lose money because it feels like just a simple mistake.
To make sure I never fall victim to this:
- I always double-check the full address before sending a transaction. I don’t just glance at the first 4 or last 4 characters; I verify a chunk in the middle too, or the entire string if possible.
- For important transactions, I sometimes send a small test amount first, confirm it with the recipient, then send the rest. This way if I did mess up, the loss is minimal.
- I keep an updated address book in a secure manner. Some wallets allow you to save contacts with nicknames. I ensure I’m selecting from a trusted saved address, not from a random recent transaction.
- If someone sends me a receiving address, I prefer to copy it fresh from our communication (and even then, I confirm with them via another channel if it’s a large amount). I never assume an address stays the same or that I can reuse an old one without checking.
My rule of thumb: treat a crypto address like a bank account and routing number combined – you wouldn’t wire money without verifying those numbers, so I shouldn’t send crypto without verifying the address thoroughly. A minute of extra caution can prevent a loss that might haunt me forever.
Using fake wallet apps or hardware wallets
Finally, one of the scariest threats is when the very tools we use to store crypto turn out to be fakes. There are fake wallet apps out there designed to look exactly like the real thing, but when you create a wallet or enter your keys, they silently send that information to the scammers. There are also instances of tampered hardware wallets being sold by third parties, where the attacker has inserted a backdoor or even preset the device with their own seed phrase.
Early on, I nearly fell for a fake wallet app. I searched online for a popular wallet (I’ll call it “BestWallet” for example), and the top result looked like an official site, but something was off – the URL was slightly different. It was a convincing copy of the real site. Had I downloaded the app from there, I might have ended up with a malicious clone on my phone. In one confirmed case I heard about, an over-the-counter crypto seller had their customer install a wallet app to receive payment. The customer used a random link from the web, not the official app store. The app installed fine and looked normal. The seller sent a large amount of USDT (a cryptocurrency) to the customer’s new wallet address. As they were chatting (the customer’s phone still connected to the internet), the funds suddenly disappeared from the wallet. Both the buyer and seller were baffled. It turned out the app was a fake – it immediately transmitted the private key to the scammer once the wallet was created. The scammer waited for a deposit to hit the wallet and then swept the funds instantly. In that situation, there was no recourse. The money was gone, and the fake app was the culprit.
Hardware wallets have a similar cautionary tale. These devices are great for security, but only if you trust the source you got them from. I have a friend who decided to buy a popular hardware wallet from an online marketplace because it was a bit cheaper than the official website. When it arrived, it looked real enough, though the packaging seal was broken (that should have been a warning sign). He set it up and transferred a small amount of crypto onto it to test. Within days, that crypto had vanished. How? We suspect the device was pre-configured by someone. Perhaps they had loaded a known seed phrase into it or implanted some rogue firmware. As soon as my friend’s device went online to sync or he entered his recovery phrase, the attackers had what they needed. When he reached out to the hardware wallet company support, they told him that they’ve seen this happen and that devices from unofficial vendors can’t be trusted. He was advised to only buy directly from the company or authorized resellers from then on. It was a tough lesson, but luckily he lost only a small test amount and not his entire savings.
These stories taught me a clear lesson: only use official, trusted sources for wallet software and devices. Now I only download wallet apps from the official App Store/Play Store or the official website (making sure the URL is correct). I also double-check the developer name on app stores to avoid look-alike apps. For hardware wallets, I purchase them straight from the manufacturer or their authorized dealer, even if it costs a bit more or takes a bit longer. And when I receive a new hardware wallet, I ensure the security seal is intact and the device wasn’t previously initialized. Reputable hardware wallets will never come with a pre-set seed phrase; if one does, that’s a huge red flag that it’s fraudulent.
To sum up some precautions regarding wallet software and devices:
- Official downloads only: I don’t trust random links. I go directly to the official project site or app store page. Bookmark the official site to avoid phishing links.
- Verify the app: Check reviews, developer info, and number of downloads. A fake app might have fewer downloads or odd reviews. The official app usually has an established presence.
- Secure your hardware wallet: Buy it new from official sources. When setting it up, it should generate a brand-new seed phrase that only you know. If a device ever comes with a “factory preset” seed or any written card of words already filled out, do NOT use it.
- Reset if in doubt: If I suspect anything fishy about a wallet (software or hardware), I stop using it immediately. Better to move funds to a secure new wallet (using your backed-up keys on a legitimate app) than to continue on a compromised platform.
Each of these scams preys on trust and tiny mistakes. By being aware of them, I make sure I’m not an easy target. I slow down and double-check, even if I’m in a hurry or excited about a new opportunity. In the wild west of crypto, security is ultimately my own responsibility.
| Threat Type | How the Scam Works | Real Example | How to Protect Yourself |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Exposing Private Keys or Seed Phrase | Hacker gets your seed phrase → instantly controls your wallet | A friend restored wallet over hotel Wi-Fi → entire $40k drained within hours | Never enter seed online, avoid public Wi-Fi, keep keys offline, use hardware wallets |
| 2. Malicious Apps / Smart Contract Approvals | You approve a fake dApp → scammer gets permission to drain tokens | Friend approved a “high-yield JST farm” → scammers transferred all his USDT | Only trust reputable dApps, check permissions, revoke old approvals regularly |
| 3. Sending Crypto to Wrong Address | Scammer mimics known addresses (0-value tx trick) → you copy wrong one | 0 ETH spam tx inserted into history; people copy fake address by mistake | Verify full address, use saved contacts, send test tx first, never copy from history |
| 4. Fake Wallet Apps (Software Wallet Scams) | Fake wallet looks real → steals your private key when created/imported | User installed fake USDT wallet; funds disappeared instantly after deposit | Download only from official App Stores or official website; verify developer name |
| 5. Fake or Tampered Hardware Wallets | Device is pre-initialized or modified → attacker knows your seed | Friend bought “cheaper” hardware wallet; funds vanished after setup | Buy only from official vendors; check seals; genuine devices generate NEW seed phrases |
| 6. Public Networks, Malware, Clipboard Attacks | Wi-Fi sniffing or clipboard malware steals pasted keys | Seed phrase entered on hotel Wi-Fi → hacker logs it and drains wallet | Avoid public Wi-Fi; avoid copy/paste; use offline devices for key entry |
| 7. Phishing & Fake Websites | Fake sites mimic real ones to steal login or seed phrase | Website URL looked legitimate but was a clone | Confirm URL, bookmark official links, type addresses manually |
Conclusion
In the end, keeping my crypto secure comes down to personal responsibility, staying alert, and following simple best practices—small steps that make a big difference. Contact MinerSource Purchase Miner Machine Now!